LIBERAL ELITE

Posted on 2025/05/30 by secret santa

DEATH of the YUPPIE DREAM
https://dissentmagazine.org/origins-of-the-professional-managerial-class
https://libcom.org/professional-managerial-class-barbara-and-john-ehrenreich
https://inthesetimes.com/article/death-of-a-yuppie-dream
The rise and fall of the professional-managerial class
by Barbara Ehrenreich & John Ehrenreich / February 19, 2013

“Every would-be populist in American politics purports to defend the “middle class,” although there is no agreement on what it is. Just in the last couple of years, the “middle class” has variously been defined as everybody, everybody minus the 15 percent living below the federal poverty level; or everybody minus the very richest Americans. Mitt Romney famously excluded “those in the low end” but included himself (2010 income $21.6 million) along with “80 to 90 percent” of Americans. The Department of Commerce has given up on income-based definitions, announcing in a 2010 report that “middle class families” are defined “by their aspirations more than their income […]. Middle class families aspire to home ownership, a car, college education for their children, health and retirement security and occasional family vacations” — which excludes almost no one.

Class itself is a muddled concept, perhaps especially in America, where any allusion to the different interests of different occupational and income groups is likely to attract the charge of “class warfare.” If class requires some sort of “consciousness,” or capacity for concerted action, then a “middle class” conceived of as a sort of default class — what you are left with after you subtract the rich and the poor — is not very interesting. But there is another, potentially more productive, interpretation of what has been going on in the mid-income range. In 1977, we first proposed the existence of a “professional-managerial class,” distinct from both the “working class,” from the “old” middle class of small business owners, as well as from the wealthy class of owners.

The origins of the professional-managerial class
The notion of the “PMC” was an effort to explain the largely “middle class” roots of the New Left in the sixties and the tensions that were emerging between that group and the old working class in the seventies, culminating in the political backlash that led to the election of Reagan. The right embraced a caricature of this notion of a “new class,” proposing that college-educated professionals — especially lawyers, professors, journalists, and artists — make up a power-hungry “liberal elite” bent on imposing its version of socialism on everyone else.

The PMC grew rapidly. From 1870 to 1910 alone, while the whole population of the United States increased two and one-third times and the old middle class of business entrepreneurs and independent professionals doubled, the number of people in what could be seen as PMC jobs grew almost eightfold. And in the years that followed, that growth only accelerated. Although a variety of practical and theoretical obstacles prevent making any precise analysis, we estimate that as late as 1930, people in PMC occupations still made up less than 1 percent of total employment. By 1972, about 24 percent of American jobs were in PMC occupations. By 1983 the number had risen to 28 percent and by 2006, just before the Great Recession, to 35 percent.

The relationship between the emerging PMC and the traditional working class was, from the start, riven with tensions. It was the occupational role of managers and engineers, along with many other professionals, to manage, regulate, and control the life of the working class. They designed the division of labor and the machines that controlled workers’ minute-by-minute existence on the factory floor, manipulated their desire for commodities and their opinions, socialized their children, and even mediated their relationship with their own bodies. At the same time though, the role of the PMC as “rationalizers” of society often placed them in direct conflict with the capitalist class. Like the workers, the PMC were themselves employees and subordinate to the owners, but since what was truly “rational” in the productive process was not always identical to what was most immediately profitable, the PMC often sought autonomy and freedom from their own bosses.

By the mid-twentieth century, jobs for the PMC were proliferating. Public education was expanding, the modern university came into being, local governments expanded in size and role, charitable agencies merged, newspaper circulation soared, traditional forms of recreation gave way to the popular culture, entertainment and sports industries, etc. — and all of these developments created jobs for highly educated professionals, including journalists, social workers, professors, doctors, lawyers, and “entertainers” (artists and writers among others). Some of these occupations managed to retain a measure of autonomy and, with it, the possibility of opposition to business domination. The so-called “liberal professions,” particularly medicine and law, remained largely outside the corporate framework until well past the middle of the 20th century. Most doctors, many nurses, and the majority of lawyers worked in independent (private) practices.

In the 1960s, for the first time since the Progressive Era, a large segment of the PMC had the self-confidence to take on a critical, even oppositional, political role. Jobs were plentiful, a college education did not yet lead to a lifetime of debt, and materialism was briefly out of style. College students quickly moved on from supporting the civil rights movement in the South and opposing the war in Vietnam to confronting the raw fact of corporate power throughout American society — from the pro-war inclinations of the weapons industry to the governance of the university. The revolt soon spread beyond students. By the end of the sixties, almost all of the liberal professions had “radical caucuses,” demanding that access to the professions be opened up to those traditionally excluded (such as women and minorities), and that the service ethics the professions claimed to uphold actually be applied in practice.

The capitalist offensive
Beginning in the seventies, the capitalist class decisively re-asserted itself. The ensuing capitalist offensive was so geographically widespread and thoroughgoing that it introduced what many leftwing theorists today describe as a new form of capitalism, “neoliberalism.” The new management strategy was to raise profits by single-mindedly reducing labor costs, most directly by simply moving manufacturing offshore to find cheaper labor. Those workers who remained employed in the United States faced a series of initiatives designed to discipline and control them ever more tightly: intensified supervision in the workplace, drug tests to eliminate slackers, and increasingly professionalized efforts to prevent unionization. Cuts in the welfare state also had a disciplining function, making it harder for workers to imagine surviving job loss.

Most of these anti-labor measures also had an effect, directly or indirectly, on elements of the PMC. Government spending cuts hurt the job prospects of social workers, teachers, and others in the “helping professions,” while the decimation of the U.S.-based industrial working class reduced the need for mid-level professional managers, who found themselves increasingly targeted for downsizing. But there was a special animus against the liberal professions, surpassed only by neoliberal hostility to what conservatives described as the “underclass.” Crushing this liberal elite — by “defunding the left” or attacking liberal-leaning nonprofit organizations — became a major neoliberal project.

Of course, not all the forces undermining the liberal professions since the 1980s can be traced to conscious neoliberal policies. Technological innovation, rising demand for services, and ruthless profit-taking all contributed to an increasingly challenging environment for the liberal professions, including the “creative ones.” The Internet is often blamed for the plight of journalists, writers, and editors, but economic change preceded technological transformation. Journalism jobs began to disappear as corporations, responding in part to Wall Street investors, tried to squeeze higher profit margins out of newspapers and TV news programs. The effects of these changes on the traditionally creative professions have been dire. Staff writers, editors, photographers, announcers, and the like faced massive layoffs (more than 25% of newsroom staff alone since 2001), increased workloads, salary cuts, and buy-outs.

Then, in just the last dozen years, the PMC began to suffer the fate of the industrial class in the 1980s: replacement by cheap foreign labor. It came as a shock to many when, in the 2000s, businesses began to avail themselves of new high speed transmission technologies to outsource professional functions. By the time of the financial meltdown and deep recession of the post-2008 period, the pain inflicted by neoliberal policies, both public and corporate, extended well beyond the old industrial working class and into core segments of the PMC. Unemployed and underemployed professional workers — from IT to journalism, academia, and eventually law — became a regular feature of the social landscape.

Young people did not lose faith in the value of an education, but they learned quickly that it makes more sense to study finance rather than physics or “communications” rather than literature. The old PMC dream of a society rule by impartial “experts” gave way to the reality of inescapable corporate domination. But the PMC was not only a victim of more powerful groups. It had also fallen into a trap of its own making. The prolonged, expensive, and specialized education required for professional employment had always been a challenge to PMC families — as well, of course, as an often-insuperable barrier to the working class. Higher degrees and licenses are no longer a guarantee of PMC status. Hence the iconic figure of the Occupy Wall Street movement: the college graduate with tens of thousands of dollars in student loan debts and a job paying about $10 a hour, or no job at all.

Whither class consciousness?
So in the hundred years since its emergence, the PMC has not managed to hold its own as a class. At its wealthier end, skilled professionals continue to jump ship for more lucrative posts in direct service to capital: Scientists give up their research to become “quants” on Wall Street; physicians can double their incomes by finding work as investment analysts for the finance industry or by setting up “concierge” practices serving the wealthy. At the less fortunate end of the spectrum, journalists and PhDs in sociology or literature spiral down into the retail workforce. In between, health workers and lawyers and professors find their work lives more and more hemmed in and regulated by corporation-like enterprises. The center has not held. Conceived as “the middle class” and as the supposed repository of civic virtue and occupational dedication, the PMC lies in ruins.

More profoundly, the PMC’s original dream — of a society ruled by reason and led by public-spirited professionals — has been discredited. Globally, the socialist societies that seemed to come closest to this goal either degenerated into heavily militarized dictatorships or, more recently, into authoritarian capitalist states. Within the US, the grotesque failure of socialism in China and the Soviet Union became a propaganda weapon in the neoliberal war against the public sector in its most innocuous forms and a core argument for the privatization of just about everything. But the PMC has also managed to discredit itself as an advocate for the common good. Consider our gleaming towers of medical research and high-technology care — all too often abutting urban neighborhoods characterized by extreme poverty and foreshortened life spans. Should we mourn the fate of the PMC or rejoice that there is one less smug, self-styled, elite to stand in the way of a more egalitarian future?

On the one hand, the PMC has played a major role in the oppression and disempowering of the old working class. It has offered little resistance to (and, in fact, supplied the manpower for) the right’s campaign against any measure that might ease the lives of the poor and the working class. On the other hand, the PMC has at times been a “liberal” force, defending the values of scholarship and human service in the face of the relentless pursuit of profit. In this respect, its role in the last century bears some analogy to the role of monasteries in medieval Europe, which kept literacy and at least some form of inquiry alive while the barbarians raged outside. As we face the deepening ruin brought on by neoliberal aggression, the question may be: Who, among the survivors, will uphold those values today? And, more profoundly, is there any way to salvage the dream of reason — or at least the idea of a society in which reasonableness can occasionally prevail — from the accretion of elitism it acquired from the PMC?

Any renewal of oppositional spirit among the Professional-Managerial Class, or what remains of it, needs to start from an awareness that what has happened to the professional middle class has long since happened to the blue collar working class. The debt-ridden unemployed and underemployed college graduates, the revenue-starved teachers, the overworked and underpaid service professionals, even the occasional whistle-blowing scientist or engineer — all face the same kind of situation that confronted skilled craft-workers in the early 20th century and all American industrial workers in the late 20th century. In the coming years, we expect to see the remnants of the PMC increasingly making common cause with the remnants of the traditional working class for, at a minimum, representation in the political process. This is the project that the Occupy movement initiated and spread, for a time anyway, worldwide.”

[ Excerpted from RLS-NYC ]

the PROFESSIONAL MANAGERIAL CLASS
https://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1125403552886481.pdf
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/characterless-opportunism-of-managerial-class
https://rosalux.nyc/backgroundnotes1/
Background Notes for Death of a Yuppie Dream
by John Ehrenreich and Barbara Ehrenreich / January 31, 2013

“The Absorption of the Liberal Professions into Corporation-Like Enterprises
During the last fifty years, rapidly accelerating in the last twenty or so, corporations (or other large institutions, such as “mega” law firms, hospitals, and universities—organized along more-or-less corporate lines and sharing corporation priorities) have come to be the employers of most of those in the “liberal professions.” Increasingly, the work experience of most of those in these professions is coming to look like the work experience in engineering and the business service professions.

Health Care Professions
(a) The central factor in transforming health care was a qualitative change in the actual service provided by health care professionals. In the years following World War II, a vast array of new technologies for diagnosing and treating illness appeared—drugs, MRIs and other radiological devices, pacemakers, operating room monitors, defibrillators, implants, computerized record keeping systems, etc. For the first time, medicine could actually do something for you—but at a price. Only hospitals could afford the new technology, and in many cases, the new procedures were intrinsically hospital-based. And despite the “not-for-profit” status of most hospitals, profits there were! By 2010, health care had become a $2.6 trillion per year industry, a ten-fold increase since 1960 and one driven directly and indirectly by the new technology.¹ Drug companies alone earned more than $60 billion in profits in 2010, medical supply and equipment companies almost as much more. Given the profits to be made from health care, not surprisingly, a new breed of proprietary (for profit) health care facilities—hospitals, nursing homes, and medical laboratories—emerged, earning well over a billion dollars in profits in 2010.² To pay for health care, insurance became essential, and with it, yet another way to profit off heath care. The five biggest health insurance companies alone earned over $12 billion in 2010. Health care, once a sleepy “not-for-profit” sector, had become big business.³

As the hospitals grew, so did doctors’ dependence on them. Solo practice—and certainly solo practice without hospital affiliation—became all but impossible. Doctors were pulled into multi-doctor groups and hospital based practice. Between 1983 and 1997, the proportion of patient-care physicians working as salaried employees rose from 24% to 43%, and by 1997, more than two thirds of young doctors with up to five years in practice were salaried.⁴ Increasingly even group practices were owned by hospitals, not by the doctors themselves. By 2010, more than half of practicing U.S. physicians were directly employed by hospitals or by integrated delivery systems.⁵The hospitals’ growth transformed the very definition of “medical professional.” An army of new college trained professionals—medical technologists, nurses, physical therapists, occupational therapists, lab techs, and the like—took over many activities formerly carried out (in more primitive versions) by doctors.

And as medical enterprise grew and as the need to keep revenues above ever increasing costs increased (regardless of ownership—public, not-for-profit, or proprietary), hospital management professionalized. Hospital managers were now trained in schools of business, rather than medical or nursing school. Health care came to be organized largely along corporate lines, with non-technically (i.e., non-medically) trained managers; a corps of highly trained staff, analogous to engineers, organizing and directing “production” (the physicians and, in varying degrees, the nurses, technologists, and other therapists); and a “working class” stratum of nurses aides, kitchen workers, laundry workers, and the like performing more routinized work. At all levels, pressures to cut costs grew—from the hospitals, from the insurance companies, and increasingly from the government (due to its role in financing Medicaid and Medicare).

The Legal Profession
(b) If changes in the nature of the services offered drove the changes in health care, it was a great expansion in the demand for legal services that transformed the legal profession. The legal services boom was driven by the expansion of government regulation; the rapid growth of the legal-services-hungry financial and governmental sectors; the emergence of new practice areas such as environmental law, intellectual property law, pension and benefits law, and health law; and shifts in legal practices making it easier to use the legal system (e.g., reductions in obstacles to class action litigation). In response, the proportion of American gross national product (GNP) accounted for by lawyers’ services doubled between 1967 and 1997.⁶The growing need for legal services was met by a vast expansion in the number of lawyers. Law schools expanded rapidly. First year law classes grew from around 15,000 per year in the mid fifties to 34,000 by the late sixties and 40,000 by 1978. The nation’s supply of lawyers grew from 211,000 in 1960 to 650,000 twenty years later and almost a million today. And the new lawyers were a different breed: increasingly it was women, Jews, and those from racial and ethnic minority groups that entered the field.⁷

The field’s expansion and the rapid growth in the number of lawyers led to increased competition for legal business, which in turn led to mergers and consolidation of law firms. The number of lawyers working in corporate-like settings soared. Around 1960, there were fewer than forty law firms employing as many as fifty or more lawyers; today, there are many hundreds, twenty-one of which employ more than one thousand lawyers each.⁸ Currently 42% of all practicing lawyers work in one of the biggest 250 firms or in other institutional settings (corporations, government, and the not-for-profit sector). By 1992, solo practitioners, though still making up 35% of all lawyers, accounted for only about one-tenth of all lawyer revenues.⁹Once, to be a lawyer was to be a member of an elite guild. Lawyers served as “counselors” to their clients. “Ethical” codes and rules limited advertising. But with the rapid increase in the supply of lawyers, the balance of power shifted. Now competition for legal work increased and clients could make demands.

To make matters worse, the growing demand for legal and legal-like service drew in outside competition, from tax preparation services, self-help law books, and (later) Internet based services for writing wills, incorporating businesses, and carrying out other “legal” matters. Lawyers had to pay increased attention to the “business” of lawyering. Working in a “mega firm” bore little resemblance to the old experience of solo practice or the small partnership. Although the partnership form of business does mean that staff lawyers often remain “owners,” management of the large law firm is now concentrated in the hands of a small subset of senior partners (often specializing in management). In many ways, a job in such a firm is like working in any other large corporation. The company can make demands on junior associates for extraordinarily long hours; promotion to partner is based on bringing in business rather than good work done; and even a partnership is no guarantee of job security.¹⁰

The drive for greater efficiency at law firms took many forms. There was an increased division of labor, with “specialty” departments taking on more and more of the work. Computers were enlisted to mechanize services previously performed by individual lawyers (e.g., document preparation, legal research, and communication). Outsourcing a variety of services spread (see below). All these adaptations have succeeded in making large law firms and in-house corporate law operations more efficient, but at a growing cost to those entering the profession. Slowing growth and greater efficiency has led to far fewer jobs available per year than new graduates. Only 30-35% of recent law school graduates are actually finding permanent, full-time jobs requiring a law degree within nine months of graduating from law school, and incomes for lawyers, once growing rapidly, have since 2005 barely kept up with inflation. The status of solo practitioners is even worse, with average incomes currently hovering around $50,000/year—not enough to pay off law school debts and maintain a decent living standard.¹¹

Journalism and Publishing
(c) Changes in the larger society, such as the rise of the Internet, are often blamed for the plight of journalists, writers, and editors. But the transformation of journalism and publishing long preceded the Internet. Most professionals in these areas already worked for corporations, but they are now experiencing the impact of a wave of corporate consolidation—in the context of the rise of the Internet, cable television networks, and social media. Newspapers had always been businesses, of course, and faced competition for readers and advertisers. Radio (from the 1930s on), television (from the 1950s on), and cable television networks (from the 1990s on) added new competitive pressures. Beginning in the 1920s, a process of consolidation took place. In 1909 there were 689 cities in the United States that had two or more competing daily newspapers; by 1963 that number had shrunk to 55, and now there are fewer than ten. As early as the 1960s and early 1970s, many papers (e.g., the New York Times and the Washington Post) went public to raise capital. Under the pressure of growing costs and declining revenue, mergers continued, often financed by a large debt load, which made the papers especially vulnerable to economic downturns.¹²

Despite the competition, many newspapers flourished. But by the late 1990s, as corporations—responding in part to Wall Street investors—tried to squeeze higher profit margins out of the newspapers, journalism jobs began to disappear. “Editors at papers across the country became increasingly frustrated that editorial decisions were being made not in order to keep the papers afloat, but to propel profit levels ever higher.”¹³ As the millennium changed, a new, even more potent challenge arrived: the Internet. Craig’s List, eBay, and other Internet services took much of the classified ad business away from the papers. Then came the recession, and revenues fell even further (40% between 2003 and 2009 alone). Many papers tried to compensate for declining newspaper revenues by diversifying into non-journalistic areas. The Washington Post, for example, owns a for-profit university (Kaplan), radio stations, a cable station, and the online magazine Slate. The New York Times owns the International Herald Tribune, the Boston Globe, fifteen other daily newspapers, more than fifty web sites, and is a minority stakeholder in the Boston Red Sox.¹⁴ But for many papers it was too late. Even profitable papers, such as the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Minneapolis Star Tribune, faced with a massive burden of debt, were forced into bankruptcy.¹⁵

The book publishing industry, too, has been transformed by mergers. Historically, publishing was characterized by many small publishers. Competition for market share focused more on taste (e.g., who your authors were) than on reducing costs and finding other efficiencies. Beginning in the sixties, a series of mergers increased the size of the major players. Knopf, Pantheon, and Doubleday, among others, were gobbled up by Random House, which itself was then bought by RCA and later sold to the German publishing company Bertelsmann. Simon and Schuster (and for a while, Prentice Hall and MacMillan) were bought by Gulf and Western and later sold to CBC; Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. swallowed up Harper Collins. At the same time, the other end of book publishing—book selling—was also being transformed by consolidations. The big chains (Barnes and Noble, B. Dalton, and Borders) drove many small bookstores out of business, and more recently, Internet retailers such as Amazon have gobbled up an increasing share of the market (a share only increased by the recent arrival of e-books). By 2004, eighty per cent of the retail book market was in the hands of eight big chains plus Amazon.

Along with consolidation came a change in management. The old author-editor-publishers such as Alfred Knopf and Bennett Cerf were no more. The new corporate managers—whether from Bertelsmann or Viacom or News Corp.—wanted a higher rate of return. Pressures on profits from the enlarged retailers increased the need to cut costs and increase efficiency. Cutbacks in advances to authors and outsourcing of editing, proofing, graphic design, and—for textbooks—even parts of content creation, have increased the pressures on writers and editors alike.¹⁶With minor variations, the same story could be told of much of the media—magazine publishing, academic publishing, television and radio, and the like. Corporations that had in earlier days remained somewhat aloof from the more rapacious behavior characteristic of other sectors of the economy merged and grew.¹⁷ Staff writers, editors, photographers, announcers, and the like faced massive layoffs (more than 25% of newsroom staff alone since 2001), increased work loads, salary cuts, and the loss of their sense of publishing as being a “different” kind of industry, concerned with its product as much as with revenues. From the perspective of freelance writers and artists, it has meant a constriction of opportunities. While the Internet itself provides a growing set of outlets for writers, it has yet to develop a financial model that provides compensation.

Outsourcing
Yet another source of corporate pressure on the liberal professions (as on engineering and management) was outsourcing. Manufacturing jobs had been outsourced for several decades. But the recession of 2001 made further increases in productivity essential, and coincidentally, it was at just that time that new technologies permitting low cost, good quality, and high speed transmission of voice and data appeared. While good statistics on the total number of professional jobs are hard to find, some projections suggest that by 2010, more than two thirds of a million professional jobs, previously done in the US, would be done abroad. For health care workers, it was reading x-rays, MRIs, colonoscopies, and echocardiograms; analyzing pathology specimens; monitoring ICU patients; operating nurse call centers; performing orthopedic procedures such as preparing digital prosthetic templates; and keeping and manipulating medical records. For lawyers it was legal transcription, document review, review of litigation emails, legal research, contract-related services, and legal publishing services. For those in the publishing industry it was editing, proofing, graphic design, and—for textbooks—even parts of content creation. For engineers and computer professionals, it was product design, development of phone apps and mobile phone chips, systems programming, and network design. Even business professionals and managers were hit by outsourcing of activities such as processing mortgage applications and preparing corporate financial analyses and industry reports.¹⁸

Sources
1 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that about half of the increase was directly attributable to technology. Indirectly, the improvements in health care drove two other factors increasing health expenditures: the increase in demand for services and increased longevity. http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8947/01-31-TechHealth.pdf

2 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/industries/222/index.html

3 The integration of the health care sector with the corporate world was evident as early as 1970. See Barbara and John Ehrenreich and Health-PAC, The American Health Empire: Power, Profits, and Politics (Random House, 1971).

4 P.R. Kletke et al, 1994, 1996, cited in John B McKinlay and Lisa D. Marceau (2002), “The End of the Golden Age of Doctoring.” International Journal of Health Services 32 (2), 379-416.

5 http://nytimes.com/2010/03/26/health /policy/26docs.html; http://nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1101959

6 Marc Galanter, Old and in the way: The coming demographic transformation off the legal profession and its implications for the provision of legal services, Fairchild lecture, University of Wisconsin Law School, October 29, 1999, retrievable at http://marcgalanter.net/Documents/oldandintheway.pdf; Abe Krash, “The Changing Legal Profession.” Washington Lawyer, January 2012. Retrievable online at http://dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/january_2008/changes.cfm

7 Galanter, op cit; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1973, 2001, 2009.

8 America’s Largest 250 Law Firms. Internet Legal Research Group.http://ilrg.com/nlj250/attorneys/desc/1

9 Analysis of the Legal Profession and Law Firms, Harvard Law School. http://law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pages/statistics.php

10 See Krash, op. cit.

11 Paul Campos, Served: How law schools completely misrepresent their job numbers.http://tnr.com/article/87251/law-school-employment-harvard-yale-georgetown; David Segal, “Is Law School a Losing game?” New York Times. http://nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?pagewanted=all

12 The poster child for failure due to leveraged over-expansion is the Tribune Company, which by 2008 owned twelve newspapers, twenty-three television stations, a national cable channel, and assorted other media holdings, but which was also $13 billion in debt. Faced with declining circulation and ad revenues, it was unable to pay its debts and declared bankruptcy.

13 Federal Communications Commission (n.d.). The Media Landscape. http://transition.fcc.gov/osp/inc-report/INoC-1-Newspapers.pdf

14 Suzanne M. Kirchoff, The U.S. Newspaper Industry in Transition. Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2010, retrieved online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40700.pdf

15 See David Carr, “The Fissures are Growing for Papers,” New York Times, July 8, 2012.

16 Boris Kachka. “The End.” New York Magazine, September 14, 2008 (retrieved at http://nymag.com/news/media/50279/); Williams Cole, “Is Publishing Doomed?” Brooklyn Rail, November 2010, retrieved online at http://brooklynrail.org/2010/11/express/is-publishing-doomed-john-b-thompson-with-williams-cole

17 Eli Noam, Media ownership and concentration in America, New York: Oxford (2009).

18 Ron Hira (The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers). Global Outsourcing of Engineering Jobs: Recent Trends and Possible Implications. Testimony to the Committee on Small Business, United States House of Representatives (June 2003). http://cspo.org/products/lectures/061803.pdf;Linda Levine (Congressional Research Service), Offshoring (a.k.a. Offshore Outsourcing) and Job Insecurity Among U.S. Workers. May 2, 2005 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46688.pdf);David Wessel, Big U.S. Firms Shift Hiring Abroad. Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2011, retrieved online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704821704576270783611823972.html; Pete Engardio, Aaron Bernstein, and Manjeet Kripalani, “The New Global Job Shift.” Business Week, February 2003, retrieved online at http://businessweek.com/stories/2003-02-02/the-new-global-job-shift; Kletke, op cit.

PREVIOUSLY